GTAP Resources: Resource Display
| GTAP Resource #6958 |
|---|
|
"Rebating revenues from a unilateral emission price" by Böhringer, Christoph, Carolyn Fischer and Nic Rivers Abstract We evaluate alternative options for rebating revenues from a unilateral emission price, focusing on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industry. We show that distortionary rebating policies may be welfare-improving when there is emission leakage, when there are terms-of-trade changes associated with the introduction of an emission price, or when political or other constraints prevent the emission price being set at the optimal level. We use a numerical simulation model to compare different emission price rebating options, and find that rebating emission price revenues proportionately to output reduces emission leakage and is typically superior to other rebating options when the emission price is set close to the social cost of emissions. Rebating emission revenues proportionately to emission intensity increases emission abatement, and is typically superior when the unilateral emission price is set significantly below the social cost of emissions. We show that incorrect choice of rebating option can lead to significant welfare losses. |
| Resource Details (Export Citation) | GTAP Keywords | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
- Climate change policy - GTAP Data Base and extensions - European Union - North America |
| Attachments |
|---|
|
If you have trouble accessing any of the attachments below due to disability, please contact the authors listed above.
Public Access  Revenue-Rebating-BFR (719.8 KB) Replicated: 0 time(s)Restricted Access No documents have been attached. Special Instructions No instructions have been specified. |
| Comments (0 posted) |
|---|
|
You must log in before entering comments.
No comments have been posted. |
Last Modified: 9/15/2023 1:05:45 PM
