GTAP Resources: Resource Display
| GTAP Resource #7164 |
|---|
|
"Trade Policy as Climate Policy: Payoffs and Tradeoffs " by Devarajan, Shanta, Delfin S Go, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder Abstract Countries that unilaterally curb their own carbon emissions, a global public good, have an interest in other countries’ doing the same. Using a global simulation model, we explore how carbon-taxing countries can use trade policy to induce other countries to lower their carbon emissions. The European Union (EU)’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, in which non-carbon-taxing countries face import tariffs in carbon-intensive sectors, while it helps EU producers, will not reduce global emissions because exporting countries can diversify their trade partners. A climate club, in which members adopt a carbon tax and impose tariffs against all products from non-members, can reduce global emissions by inducing non-taxing countries to join the club. However, club members strongly linked to non-club regions through trade suffer losses, adding to the cost of club membership. Furthermore, the tariffs needed to induce all regions to join the club are high and punitive. |
| Resource Details (Export Citation) | GTAP Keywords | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
- Climate change policy - Environmental policies - Trade and the environment - Supply chains - Asia (Southeast) - European Union - North America |
| Attachments |
|---|
|
If you have trouble accessing any of the attachments below due to disability, please contact the authors listed above.
Public Access  Paper (2.6 MB) Replicated: 0 time(s)Restricted Access No documents have been attached. Special Instructions No instructions have been specified. |
| Comments (0 posted) |
|---|
|
You must log in before entering comments.
No comments have been posted. |
Last Modified: 9/15/2023 2:05:45 PM
