GTAP Resources: Resource Display
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"Bargaining for an efficient and fair allocation of emission permits to developing countries" by Kremers, Hans Abstract The paper focusses on the negotiations between the developed countries currently implementing emission permit markets versus the developing countries who want to join this market. We model the negotiations according to the ’Alternating Offers Bargaining’ model. The ob jective is to obtain an efficient and fair allocation of tradeable emission permits between these two players. At each period, one player proposes a feasible allocation of the goods for both players. Then the other player either ends the negotiations by accepting the proposal, or prolongs them by rejecting it. The proposal is accepted if this player considers it fair. If rejected, there is a certain probability that the next round is played and the other player making a proposal. The equilibrium concept in this model is that of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The paper is concluded with a comparison of the bargaining solution with several proposals, using the GTAP-E model as the reference model for the economy. |
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Public Access  2008 Conference Paper (406.3 KB) Replicated: 0 time(s)Restricted Access No documents have been attached. Special Instructions No instructions have been specified. |
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Last Modified: 9/15/2023 1:05:45 PM
